FLASHOVER & RELATED PHENOMENA

Paul Grimwood was invited to address the Seoul Korea Conference on High-rise Firefighting in November 2007 - He sends this short message ...

"When we are faced with a serious fire at ground level, our firefighters often encounter great difficulties and exposure to some element of risk. When they are faced with that same fire, thirty storeys above ground, the physiological demands are much greater and the difficulties and risks are greatly magnified. There may be long time delays between a fire commander's chosen strategy becoming a tactical operation on the fire floors. There may be changing circumstances during this delay that require the strategy to be altered. There will be a great demand for manpower to accomplish even the most basic operation and then, where firefighters are working hard, the need to support them in a continued attack on the fire will treble the resources operating on the fire floors. To be effective you must have a pre-plan that is based on the experience of those who have fought these types of fires and learned many lessons. The pre-plan must be well understood by everybody and to achieve this requires frequent practice in such buildings. The communication process at a high-rise fire will inevitably break down and the pre-plan must ensure that critical tasks, such as searching stair-shafts, elevators and roof, are documented as written assignments into the pre-plan. The objective is to enable firefighting teams to adapt and function in small teams with pre-assigned tasks and on occasions, without fire command supervision. Above all, avoid complacency! This is inevitably the firefighter's worst enemy! Approach every situation with care and professionalism and always try to be at least one step ahead of the fire's next move."

In 1991 Paul Grimwood published a 28-page report in his book Fog Attack and articles in the IFE Journal (UK) that stated quite simply that the vast majority of fire departments were unprepared to face a difficult fire situation on the upper floors of a high-rise residential or office building. The lack of training, pre-planning, documented procedure (SOPs) and inadequate staffing or equipment was subjecting both firefighters and building occupants to unnecessary risk.

'Since the fatal 2001 Four Leaf Towers residential tower block fire in Houston, Texas, the fire department has placed a stronger emphasis on training and staffing their fire force. The fire resulted in the deaths of a firefighter and a building occupant' ....

'Since the fatal 2002 Dolphin Cove residential condominium high-rise fire in Clearwater, Florida, the fire department has placed a stronger emphasis on training. The fire resulted in several deaths and injured firefighters'....

'Since the fatal 2003 CCAB high-rise office fire in downtown Chicago, the fire department has placed a stronger emphasis on training. Greater efforts to improve communications; transfer of information; incident command and firefighting tactics are now being seen. The fire resulted in the deaths of six occupants and the fire department are facing multi-million dollar litigation from the families of those who lost their lives' ....

'Since the fatal 2005 Harrow Court residential tower block fire in Stevenage, UK, the fire department has placed a stronger emphasis on training in incident command; transfer of information; and high-rise firefighting tactics. The fire resulted in several deaths including an occupant and two firefighters' ....

High-rise Firefighting Instructor (HRFI) Courses
Renowned expert on high-rise firefighting, UK Fire Officer Paul Grimwood, has researched firefighting experience in high-rise buildings since 1975, working on detachment with ten big city fire departments in the USA during the 1990s and attending fires in five of the world's tallest buildings including the World Trade Center, New York City and the Sears Tower in Chicago. He is adviser to a UK national (Communities & Local Government) committee reviewing high-rise procedures (2007).

He also visited the scenes of past conflagrations at the Interstate Bank in Los Angeles; the Petrona Towers in Kuala Lumpar; the Ponte building in Johannesburg and the Churchill Plaza in the UK where he discussed firefighting operations with firefighters and chiefs who attended these incidents. Using several case histories he explains how incident command systems, a detailed pre-plan (SOP), manpower and equipment logistics are key factors in any successful operation.

Petrona Towers Kuala Lumpar, Malaysia

A 5,000m² fire located high up within the confines of a downtown office high-rise structure is a lot different to the same fire located on the second floor! The logistical demands placed on firefighters have demonstrated that Incident Command needs to function well in advance of actual needs for as a plan is initiated there is a lengthy time delay prior to actioning! At two fires in 1988 (Interstate Bank) and 1991(Churchill Plaza), US and UK firefighters were faced with office fires on upper levels that demanded a fresh 30 minute SCBA cylinder every 33 seconds for the entire duration of the Interstate fire and similar requirements for a fresh 45 minute cylinder every 80 seconds in the Plaza fire! Similarly in both fires, hundreds of firefighters were required to undertake a wide range of duties, estimated at both incidents as one firefighter for every 25m2 of fire involvement.

It was in FOG ATTACK that he researched and initiated debate on reaction times - the time taken by firefighters to respond to an incident and get water flowing onto the fire on the upper levels of a high-rise. His research demonstrated 'reaction times' ranging from 9 to 40 minutes for fires located between the 10th and 33rd levels!